Four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were trained to choose from 2 hook-like tools, 1 of which successfully led to collecting food, whereas the other did not because of inappropriate spatial arrangement of the tool and the food. In Experiment 1, all of the monkeys successfully learned the basic task. The monkeys performed successfully with tools of novel colors and shapes in Experiments 2-5. These results demonstrate that the monkeys used the spatial arrangement of the tool and the food as a cue. However, they failed when there were obstacles (Experiment 6) or traps (Experiment 7) on the path along which the monkeys dragged tools. These results may suggest that capuchin monkeys understand the spatial relationship between 2 items, namely, food and the tool, but do not understand the spatial relationship among 3 items, namely, food, tool, and the environmental condition. The possible role of stimulus generalization is also considered.
Although a wide range of nonhuman animals have been demonstrated to use tools in a variety of contexts (see Beck, 1980 , for a review; some of the recent findings include Chappell & Kacelnik, 2002; Hunt, 1996; Lavallee, 1999; Peters, 2001; Phillips, 1998; Shuster & Sherman, 1998; Smolker, Richards, Connor, Mann, & Berggren, 1997; Tokida, Tanaka, Takefuchi, & Hagiwara, 1994) , they are not equal in understanding the causality involved in tools and outcomes.
For example, Visalberghi and coworkers (Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995; Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994 , 1996 reported that tufted capuchin monkeys, a New World monkey species, would insert a stick into a transparent tube to push out the food inside. In one variation of the task, Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994) used a tube with a trap-hole in the middle. The food was located next to the hole. The monkeys had to avoid pushing the food into the trap. They had serious difficulty in solving this task. The only monkey who learned to get food from the trap tube kept inserting the stick from the far side even when the tube was placed upside down so there was no trap, which suggests that this successful monkey had learned a rigid behavioral strategy instead of understanding the causal relations involved in the trap-tube task. In contrast, the 2 chimpanzees who solved the same trap-tube task performed successfully when the location of the trap was changed so that the distance-based rigid strategy would not lead to success; they succeeded to obtain food from the tube having its trap not at the center but to the left or to the right (Limongelli, Boysen, & Visalberghi, 1995) . Visalberghi et al. (1995) found a similar difference between apes and capuchin monkeys in a tube task when the sticks were bundled or shaped like an H. Namely, all three species of apes, chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans immediately unwrapped the bundle to obtain an individual stick, whereas capuchin monkeys tried to insert the bundled sticks as they were. Apes also learned to remove the dowels at both ends of the stick (H-shaped stick) before inserting it into the tube, but capuchins showed no improvement with these misshaped sticks. Comparing the performances of capuchin monkeys with great apes on the same tasks, Visalberghi and coworkers concluded that capuchins did not understand the causality involved in this task Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994) .
On the other hand, Hauser (1997) reported that another New World species, cotton-top tamarins, chose appropriate tools with which to obtain a food reward in a simple two-choice situation. He gave the tamarins two options. One of which had food "inside" of a hook-like tool that could be pulled along the substrate to bring the food to the subject. The other option had food "outside" of the tool. The tamarins learned to pull the tool in the former option providing easy access to food. Then they were tested with a variety of tools having different colors or shapes. The tamarins flexibly chose the option with which they could obtain the reward more easily without regard to the color and the shape of the tool. For instance, the tamarins chose tools of novel shapes over the original tools when only the former led to food. Hauser, Kralik, and Botto-Mahan (1999) extended this flexible choice of tool to a task in which tamarins pulled a cloth that brought food over the other that did not. Ueno and Fujita (1998) demonstrated that a male tonkean macaque chose sticks of different lengths appropriate to the distance between the monkey and food. They placed two sticks of different lengths on each side of the monkey. The monkey's choice was random when the food was nearby, but it was overwhelmingly for the longer stick when the food was farther away. In this novel situation, the monkey chose sticks before ever trying to obtain the food. His behavior seems to have been controlled by recognition of causality between tools and possible outcome.
Recently, Chappell and Kacelnik (2002) demonstrated that New Caledonian crows selected tools of appropriate lengths to retrieve food located in a transparent tube. One of the 2 crows performed well even when the tools were located far from the tube.
Thus, the available data concerning causal understanding in tool use by nonhuman animals are split even among closely related animals, such as tamarins and capuchin monkeys. This is partly because of differences in the tasks used. In fact, Anderson and Henneman (1994) reported that capuchin monkeys chose a tool of appropriate thickness to extract honey from a box. It seems necessary to compare different species using the same task.
In the present study, we tested tufted capuchin monkeys in a Hauser-type task (Hauser, 1997) in which animals chose one of the two options of tools of different colors, shapes, and arrangements to reevaluate this species' understanding of causal relationships in tool use. One advantage of the Hauser-type task is that it does not require animals to be good at manipulating objects; what is required is simply to pull one of the tools. Thus, this task is suitable to compare cognitive abilities behind tool use among different species that may naturally vary in the manipulative skill required to be successful in more complicated tool-using tasks.
Capuchin monkeys are known to be the best tool users among nonape species. They open hard-shell nuts by hitting the nuts against hard surfaces in the natural habitat (Izawa & Mizuno, 1977) . They also use stones as hammers to crack open nuts in captivity (Anderson, 1990; Ottoni & Mannu, 2001 ). On the other hand, tamarins have never been observed to use tools in the wild. Thus, we expect capuchins to be successful in performing Hausertype tool-use tasks.
We also extended the task to include obstacles and traps on the path of the tool, to test whether the monkeys understood causal relationships involving three items, namely, food, tool, and environment. Povinelli and Reaux (2000) tested chimpanzees in "trap" tasks. At first the chimpanzees failed, but they eventually learned to avoid the traps. By comparing the performances of capuchin monkeys with those of chimpanzees, we may be able to find a critical difference, if one exists, between these two species' understanding of causality.
Experiment 1: Original Training

Method
Participants. Four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) named Heiji (8-year-old male), Zilla (8-year-old female), Kiki (6-year-old female), and Pigmon (4-year-old male) participated. The monkeys were provided by the Primate Research Institute, Kyoto University, by way of its Cooperative Research Program. All of the monkeys had a variety of laboratory experience including operant discrimination, social cognition, and object choice tasks (e.g., Fujita, 2000 Fujita, , 2002 . The monkeys were kept in a group. They were not deprived of food but were given a full ration of food in the evening after all of the scheduled experiments were completed. Housing and conditions adhered to the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Primates from the Primate Research Institute, Kyoto University (1986) , and the experiments were conducted with the approval of the Animal Experiment Committee of the Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University.
Apparatus. The test box, measuring 46 cm (width) ϫ 46 cm (length) ϫ 52 cm (height), was made of transparent acrylic board (see Figure 1 ). The front wall had a door that could be slid upward to make an opening of 25 cm (width) ϫ 3 cm (height) at the bottom, through which the monkeys reached their arms toward tools. A white bubbled-vinyl-chloride tray 44 cm (width) ϫ 58 cm (length) was used to support the tools. Three vertical rails on the board, one at about 10 cm from either end and one in the middle, guided the tools in the appropriate direction when the latter were pulled along the 10.5-cm-wide channel between the rails. The tools were two identical black hooks made of colored clay sized 6.5 cm (width) ϫ 22 cm (length). Each tool was about 7-9 mm in diameter and about 30 g in weight.
Procedure. The sliding door of the test box was closed before each trial. We placed an opaque panel in front of the box to block the monkey's view. Then we placed two tools and two pieces of food (apple or sweet potato) on the tray. One of the tools had food inside it and the other had food outside it. Next we set the tray in front of the test box and removed the opaque panel. After 6 s, we opened the sliding door of the box by 3 cm to allow the monkey to reach for the tools. The monkey could obtain the food reward by simply pulling the appropriately arranged tool. This was regarded as a correct response. Pulling the inappropriately arranged tool did not usually lead to food reward. Although the monkey could obtain the reward by skillfully, or wildly, maneuvering the other tool, which was very rare, this was not regarded as correct. Sessions consisted of 12 trials. We closed the sliding door immediately after the monkey chose one of the tools (and obtained food on correct trials). Intertrial intervals were about 30 s. The sessions were run daily.
The spatial arrangements of the tool and the food are shown in Figure 2a . The lower six arrangements (1Ј through 6Ј) were left-right switches of the upper six arrangements (1 through 6). These 12 arrangements were each presented once in random order in each session. Training continued until the monkeys reached a criterion of 10 or more correct trials out of 12 in two consecutive sessions. All monkeys reached the criterion after 15 to 19 sessions. Thus, they learned to take the tool that led to food rather than the one that did not, suggesting appreciation of the spatial relationship between the tool and the food. However, they did not learn all of the arrangements at the same rate. Figure 2b shows the number of cumulative correct responses for each spatial arrangement. Symmetrical arrangements (e.g., 1 and 1Ј) were considered the same pattern. Final cumulative numbers of correct choices were significantly different among the six arrangements, Friedman test: 2 (5, N ϭ 4) ϭ 16.05, p Ͻ .01. Learning appeared fastest for Arrangement 4 (and 4Ј) and slowest for Arrangement 5 (and 5Ј).
The difference in difficulty seems to reflect the relative location of food from the monkey. In Arrangement 4 (and 4Ј), the option with closer food was correct, whereas in Arrangement 5 (and 5Ј) it was incorrect. Thus, the capuchin monkeys seem to have a tendency to reach for food closer to them. This tendency is similar to the impulsive bias shown in several other species of nonhuman primates trained on a reverse-reward contingency in which choosing a larger food array leads to a smaller one and vice versa (Anderson, Awazu, & Fujita, 2000; Boysen & Berntson, 1995; Silberberg & Fujita, 1996) . This bias, though, can be corrected when a larger food array leads to nothing Silberberg & Fujita, 1996) .
Experiment 2: Novel Color Test
All of the capuchin monkeys learned the tool-choice task. In subsequent experiments, we explored the nature of the monkeys' performances on this task. Specifically, we tested whether their learning was specific to the training situation or generalizable to new situations involving different types of tools and environments. In Experiment 2, effects of change in tool color were examined.
Method
Participants. The same 4 capuchin monkeys participated. Apparatus. The apparatus was the same one used in Experiment 1 except that new tools were introduced. The new tools had the same shape and size as the original tools but had novel colors: red and blue. Two red hooks and two blue hooks were used.
Procedure. Immediately after the monkeys finished Experiment 1, one session with red hooks and one session with blue hooks were run for each monkey. The order of sessions was counterbalanced across monkeys. Test sessions consisted of 12 trials of exactly the same spatial arrangements as in Experiment 1. The order of the trials was random. At least one training session with original tools was given between the two test sessions. Figure 3 shows the accuracy in the two test sessions and in the preceding training session with black hooks for each monkey. Performances of all of the monkeys except Zilla were significantly above chance (binomial tests) for both blue and red tools (for blue: p ϭ .006, .146, .000, and .000 for Heiji, Zilla, Kiki, and Pigmon, respectively; for red: p ϭ .039, .146, .006, and .000, respectively). Zilla's score was also significantly above chance when the color was collapsed ( p ϭ .023). The Friedman test of proportion of correct choice by individual subjects found no significant difference among the original and the two colored hooks, 2 (2, N ϭ 4) ϭ 1.50, p ϭ .472). Thus, it is clear that what the monkeys learned from the original training was not specific to tools of one particular color.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 3: Novel Shape Test 1
We next tested whether a change in tool shape would influence the monkeys' performances to examine whether their original learning was specific to tools of one particular shape.
Method
Participants. The same 4 capuchin monkeys participated. Apparatus. The apparatus was the same except that new tools were introduced. The new tools were of a novel shape, labeled parabola (see Figure 4a ). They were black and measured 6.5 cm (width) ϫ 14.5 cm (length). The weight and the thickness were the same as in the previous experiments.
Procedure. After finishing Experiment 2, the monkeys were retrained with the original hooks for at least one session. Then, test sessions with the novel tools were run. Two sessions of 12 trials having different spatial arrangements shown in Figure 4a were given. The order of tests was counterbalanced across monkeys. Note that half of the arrangements (Set A-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј, 3, 3Ј, 4, 4Ј and Set B-5, 5Ј, 6, 6Ј) had two tools in the same orientation, and the other half (Set A-5, 5Ј, 6, 6Ј, B-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј, 3, 3Ј, 4, 4Ј) had the tools in inverted orientations. This latter pattern was to test whether the monkeys simply chose the tool having food inside without regard to the orientation of the tool, or whether they took the location of the food relative to the tool into account. The order of trials was random. Figure 4b shows the accuracy on test trials for each monkey. Left bars are for the arrangements having tools in the same orientation, and right bars are for tools in inverted orientations. Monkeys showed good generalization from the original training to the new tool. Overall accuracies of all the monkeys were significantly above chance ( p ϭ .000, .000, .000, and .002 for Heiji, Zilla, Kiki, and Pigmon, respectively). There was no systematic difference between the same orientation and the inverted orientations (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: Z ϭ -0.736, p ϭ .461). Thus, what monkeys learned during training was not specific to tools of one particular shape. Figure 4c shows a comparison between inside-not-necessarilyobtainable arrangements (A-5, 5Ј, 6, 6Ј, B-3, 3Ј, 4, 4Ј; marked by squares in Figure 4a ) in trials with inverted orientations and inside-obtainable arrangements in (all) trials of same orientation. Data were collapsed across monkeys because the numbers of trials were small. Accuracy tended to be higher for inside-obtainable arrangements (60/64) than for inside-not-necessarily-obtainable arrangements (24/32), but this difference did not approach statistical significance (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test of proportion of correct choice by individual subjects: Z ϭ -1.461, p ϭ .144). Thus, although there was a nonsignificant trend suggesting that the monkeys may have used the spatial relationship inside the tool as a cue for their choice, this is not likely to have been a major cue.
Instead, accuracies collapsed for all of the subjects were significantly above chance for both arrangements ( p Ͻ .01 for each). Thus, they seem to have taken the part-of-the-tool-is-on-the-otherside-of-the-food spatial arrangement into account as well.
Experiment 4: Novel Shape Test 2
The parabola tool used in Experiment 2 somewhat resembled the top of the original tool, which was the critical part of the tool. Thus, simple stimulus generalization might explain the monkeys' success in the previous experiment, because primates may often attend to local features rather than global shape (Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Fagot & Tomonaga, 1999) . In Experiment 4, effects of a more substantial change in tool shape were examined.
Method
Participants. The same 4 capuchin monkeys participated. Apparatus. The apparatus was the same except that new tools were introduced. The new tools were of another novel shape, labeled scoop (see Figure 5a ). They were black and measured 7.5 cm (width) ϫ 19 cm (length). The weight and the thickness were the same as in previous experiments.
Procedure. After finishing Experiment 3, the monkeys were retrained with the original hooks for at least one session to confirm that the original performances were maintained. Then, test sessions with novel tools were given to each monkey. Two sessions of 12 trials having different spatial arrangements, which are shown in Figure 5a , were given. The order of tests was counterbalanced across monkeys. The order of trials was random. At least one training session with original tools was given between the two test sessions. Figure 5b shows the degree of accuracy on the test trials. All monkeys showed good generalization to the new tool ( p ϭ .004 for Heiji, Zilla, and Kiki, and p ϭ .000 for Pigmon). This showed once again the fact that the monkeys had learned something more than a specific response to the tools of one particular shape. Although there remains a possibility of simple stimulus generalization, explaining the monkeys' success by a process of generalization with past tools seems difficult in this case (see also Experiment 5). Figure 5c is a comparison of accuracies among food-nearercorrect (A-1, 1Ј, 5, 5Ј, 6, 6Ј, B-2, 2Ј, 5, 5Ј, 6, 6Ј; marked by circles), food-nearer-incorrect (A-4, 4Ј; double circles), two-foods-at-thesame-distance (A-2, 2Ј, 3, 3Ј, B-3, 3Ј, 4, 4Ј; squares), and bothcorrect (B-1, 1Ј; double squares) trials. Data are collapsed across monkeys. Accuracy for food-nearer-incorrect trials was the lowest of the four. The difference among the former three conditions was impressive. In particular, there was a big difference in accuracy between food nearer incorrect and food nearer correct. Unfortunately these differences are impossible to test statistically because of a small sample size of the latter (i.e., 2 trials for each subject). On both-correct trials, the monkeys overwhelmingly chose nearer options (7/8). Thus, the monkeys' bias for the option that presents nearer food, previously observed in Experiment 1, was suggested again in this test. However, clearly this was not the monkeys' only tactic; when two foods are at the same distance, they were correct in over 80% of trials (26/32).
Results and Discussion
Experiment 5: Novel Shape Test 3
This experiment was designed to assess the monkeys' tendency to choose the food closer to them by using tools of another novel shape. We increased the number of trials presenting closer food as incorrect options so that the effect of distance to food could be tested statistically.
Method
Participants. The same 4 capuchin monkeys participated. Apparatus. The apparatus was the same except that new tools were introduced. The new tools were of another novel shape, labeled clip (see Figure 6a ). They were black and measured 7.5 cm (width) ϫ 22 cm (length). The weight and the thickness were the same as previously.
Procedure. After finishing Experiment 4, the monkeys were retrained with the original hooks for at least one session. Then, test sessions with novel tools were given to each monkey. Two sessions of 12 trials having the spatial arrangements shown in Figure 6a were given. Specifically, in half of the arrangements (A-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј, 3, 3Ј, B-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј, 3, 3Ј; marked by circles in Figure 6a ) the monkeys had to choose the option with the food farther away. The order of tests was counterbalanced across monkeys. The order of the trials was random. At least one training session with original tools was given between the two test sessions. Figure 6b shows the monkeys' accuracy on the test trials. All monkeys showed generalization of their performances to the new tool ( p ϭ .023 for Heiji, Zilla, and Kiki, and p ϭ .007 for Pigmon). This confirmed further that the monkeys had learned more than a specific response to tools of one particular shape. Figure 6c is a comparison of accuracies among food-nearercorrect (A-6, 6Ј, B-6, 6Ј; marked by circles in Figure 6a ), foodnearer-incorrect (A-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј, 3, 3Ј, B-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј, 3, 3Ј ; double circles), and two-foods-at-the-same-distance (A-4, 4Ј, 5, 5Ј, B-4, 4Ј, 5, 5Ј; squares) trials. Data are collapsed across monkeys. Once again, the accuracy for food-nearer-incorrect trials was the lowest of the three conditions. The difference among the three arrangements was significant (Friedman test of proportion of correct choice by individual subjects, 2 [2, N ϭ 4] ϭ 6.533, p ϭ .038). Both the difference between the accuracies for food-nearerincorrect and food-nearer-correct and that between food-nearerincorrect and same-distance reached the maximum Wilcoxon signed-ranks test value supported by 4 cases (Z ϭ -1.841, p ϭ .066). However, both were significant as determined by paired t tests, t(3) ϭ 4.013, p ϭ .028, and t(3) ϭ -7.733, p ϭ .004. The accuracy for food-nearer-incorrect trials was about 60% (29/48), which was at best marginally significant by one-tailed binomial test ( p ϭ .097). Again there was a clear suggestion of a bias for the option in which food is nearer.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 6: Obstacle Test
Experiments 1 through 6 demonstrated that tufted capuchin monkeys use their knowledge of the spatial relationship between tools and foods to guide their choice of tools. Experiment 6 builds on this finding to ask the question of whether the monkeys recognize the relationship among three items, namely, tools, food, and environment. Specifically, the monkeys were confronted with trials with obstacles on the path of the tool, which either prevented the retrieval of the food or not.
Method
Participants. The same 4 capuchin monkeys participated. Apparatus. The apparatus and the tools used were those used in Experiment 1. Small blocks (plastic erasers wrapped in yellow-green vinyl tape), sized 2 cm (width) ϫ 4 cm (length) ϫ 1 cm (height), were newly introduced as obstacles.
Procedure. After finishing Experiment 5, the monkeys were retrained with the original hooks for at least one session. Then, test sessions with obstacles were run. The blocks were glued onto one or both of the tool options. Two sessions of 12 trials having different spatial arrangements of the tools, foods, and obstacles, as shown in Figure 7a , were given. Four types of arrangements (A-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј, B-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј; marked by circles in Figure 7a ) had an obstacle on only one of the two options, and the others (squares) had an obstacle on both. The order of trials was random. Before the start of the first test session, the monkeys were allowed to manipulate and tug the blocks several times so they could learn that these blocks were fixed to the tray. Figure 7b shows the accuracy on test trials. The monkeys failed to generalize their performances to the new situation. The overall accuracy was almost at a chance level (52/96). Accuracy of no monkey reached statistical significance.
Results and Discussion
However, there was a difference in accuracy between trials having obstacles on both options and those with obstacles on only one option (Figure 7c ; data for all monkeys collapsed). The accuracy for one-obstacle trials was 68.8% (22/32), which was significantly above chance at least by one-tailed binomial test ( p Ͻ .05, one-tailed), whereas that for two-obstacle trials was 46.9% (30/64; ns). All 4 monkeys showed higher accuracies for the former than for the latter. Wilcoxon signed-ranks test of proportion of correct choice by individual subjects reached the maximum difference possible between the two types of trials (Z ϭ -1.857, p ϭ .063). Corresponding paired t test detected a highly significant difference between them, t(3) ϭ 12.124, p ϭ .001. Thus, the monkeys might have recognized that obstacles could prevent them from accessing the food but did not seem to have recognized that the spatial relationship among the tool, food, and the obstacle determined accessibility to the food. Alternatively, there could have been more stimulus generalization between the original hooks trained without obstacles and the present options without obstacles that were available on the present one-obstacle trials.
Experiment 7: Trap Test
Experiment 6 demonstrated a limitation of the ability of capuchin monkeys to recognize three-item causality involving tools, food, and environment. Experiment 7 was a test of the generality of this limitation in another situation, in which the obstacles were traps rather than blocks.
Method
Participants. The same 4 capuchin monkeys participated. Apparatus. The apparatus and tools were those used in Experiment 1 except that there were visible holes 4 cm (width) ϫ 3 cm (length) as traps on the tray supporting the tools and foods. The location of the traps could be changed trial by trial.
Procedure. After finishing Experiment 6, the monkeys were retrained with the original hooks for at least one session. Then, test sessions with traps were introduced. The traps were located on one or both of the tool options. Two sessions of 12 trials having different spatial arrangements of the tools, foods, and traps, as shown in Figure 8a , were run. Four types of arrangements (A-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј, B-1, 1Ј, 2, 2Ј; marked by circles in Figure 8a ) had a trap on only one of the two options, and the others (squares) had a trap on both. The order of trials was random. Before the start of the first test session, the monkeys were allowed to inspect the traps by touching and inserting their fingers several times so that they might understand that food could fall through these holes to the floor. Figure 8b shows the accuracy on test trials. The monkeys again showed no generalization of their performances to this new situ-ation. The overall accuracy was almost at chance (53/96). No monkey performed significantly above chance.
Results and Discussion
The accuracy for one-trap trials (20/32 ϭ 62.5%) was slightly higher than that for two-trap trials (33/64 ϭ 51.6%). This trend toward greater success in one-trap trials is reminiscent of the results of one-obstacle trials in Experiment 6. However, both scores failed to reach statistical significance (Figure 8c ; data for all monkeys collapsed). The difference between one-trap trials and two-trap trials did not approach significance either (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test of proportion of correct choice by individual subjects, Z ϭ -0.368, p ϭ .713). Thus, the monkeys do not even seem to have recognized that traps could prevent them from obtaining food, nor that the spatial relationship among the tool, food, and the trap determined accessibility to food.
General Discussion
In Experiment 1, all 4 tufted capuchin monkeys learned to choose the tool option leading to food more easily (i.e., by simply pulling the tool) than the other options that required much more skillful (or perhaps wilder) maneuvering of the tool. Subsequent experiments demonstrated that this learning was not specific to the tools used in training. The monkeys showed perfect positive transfer to tools of novel colors in Experiment 2. They also showed good generalization to tools of different shapes in Experiments 3, 4, and 5. Such generalization did not seem to be due to savings in learning for each novel tool because each test trial was presented only once. Thus, the monkeys used the spatial relationship between tools and foods as a cue to choose one of the two options, irrespective of the color or shape of the tools. More specifically, the cue the monkeys used appears to have been a combination of (a) the spatial relationship of food-is-inside-the-tool and (b) partof-the-tool-is-on-the-other-side-of-the-food. Although the data obtained in Experiments 2-5 may not completely reject a possibility of simple stimulus generalization, the present performances of monkeys are consistent with the idea that capuchins have a level of causal understanding, though simple, that is comparable with that previously inferred in cotton-top tamarins (Hauser, 1997) and chimpanzees (Povinelli & Reaux, 2000) in similar situations.
However, we found one limitation of the monkeys' tool-using ability in this first series of experiments; they consistently showed a tendency to choose the option in which food was closer to them. This was most evident in Experiment 5. As pointed out earlier, such impulsiveness may be typical of nonhuman primates. This bias could have been favored by natural selection because choosing close options seems adaptive in most natural situations.
In Experiments 6 and 7, the monkeys failed to successfully generalize their performances to situations presenting new challenges, either obstacles or traps on the path of the tool. This suggests another limitation of the ability of capuchin monkeys to understand causality involved in tool use; they do not adequately understand spatial relationships among three items, namely, tools, foods, and environments. A similar but milder limitation has also been reported in chimpanzees with a task similar to the one used in the present study; they did not transfer their performance from the original task to a trap task immediately (Povinelli & Reaux, 2000) , although they are habitual tool users in the wild (Goodall, 1986; Whiten et al., 1999) , including combinatorial use of a hammer and an anvil to crack open nuts (Sugiyama & Koman, 1979) and even use of a wedge-shaped meta-tool to keep the surface of the anvil horizontal (Matsuzawa, 2001) .
The finding that capuchin monkeys have difficulty in understanding causality involving three items may account for the failure of this species in the trap-tube task used by Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994) . In the trap-tube task, monkeys were required to recognize the spatial relationships among the direction of the tool, the food, and the trap. It is possible that capuchin monkeys may have a rudimentary understanding of such three-item causality at least for some types of environmental challenges, because they successfully chose the option without the obstacles over the option with the obstacles in Experiment 6. Thus, what the monkeys do not understand may be that the food is not obtainable in some spatial arrangements of the three elements described previously, but it is obtainable in others. However, as we noted in the discussions of Experiment 6, the monkeys' performance on the one-obstacle task is also consistent with the possibility that there was generalization between training without obstacles and the correct no-obstacle alternative. Povinelli and Reaux (2000) reported that chimpanzees quickly learned to choose the correct option in tasks with traps. As our aim in this series of experiments was to examine capuchin monkeys' understanding of the causality involved in simple tool-using tasks, we did not train them up to solve problems involving obstacles or traps. Our capuchin monkeys may be able to solve such tasks after training. Recent studies suggest that capuchin monkeys may outperform macaques in some tasks using social cues (Itakura & Anderson, 1996; Kuroshima, Fujita, Adachi, Iwata, & Fuyuki, in press; Kuroshima et al., 2002; Vick & Anderson, 2000) . If physical intelligence goes together with social intelligence (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Humphrey, 1976; Whiten & Byrne, 1997) , we may expect better causality understanding in capuchin monkeys than in macaques.
